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Introduction 
 
As a result of the dominant neo-liberal approach to economic and social policy in the 
United Kingdom over the last three and a half decades British society is becoming 
increasingly fragmented with, for the first time since the 1930s, a generation of people 
set to experience worse living standards than their parents. This includes a decline in 
social mobility within and across generations, a vast chasm emerging between the 
haves and have-nots, a long-term squeeze on wages and living standards, health 
crises relating to underfunding and running down of the NHS and the move towards a 
rote-learning based secondary education system geared towards a low-wage, low-skill 
economy and a debt-fuelled higher education system that taxes aspiration and 
promotes the exclusion of less affluent students. This is supported by a political 
economy focused on the socialisation of financial sector risk, lax tax regimes for 
multinational corporations, and an economic model dependent on a housing bubble in 
London and debt-fuelled economic growth on the one hand; and, on the other; the 
individualisation of social, economic and environmental risks in terms of residual social 
protection, high levels of personal debt, and unwillingness to prepare for, and adjust 
to, crises caused by increasing extreme weather events associated with climate 
change.  
 
The individualisation of risk has been evidenced in the transformation of social policies 
and the welfare state, from ‘social security’ to ‘welfare’ (usually used in the derogatory 
sense to refer to a lack of self-reliance or ‘cultures of dependency’). A two-track 
approach to social policy making in practice has emerged focusing on ‘good welfare’ 
and ‘bad welfare’. While ‘good welfare’ involves corporate subsidies and tax breaks 
for big business or ‘wealth creators’ (corporate welfare) and, to an extent, pensions 
and benefits for older people, ‘bad welfare’ involves the management of the deficient 
and deviant behaviour of individuals into whom personal responsibility and self-
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reliance must be instilled, for example, in punitive workfare programmes in which 
unemployed people must work for benefits and by the removal of social housing 
provision and disability support schemes. The visible world of the welfare state in the, 
overwhelmingly negative, mainstream political discourse over the last thirty-five years 
has usually focused on problems with the latter while ignoring the negative 
consequences of the former. 
  
In this context it is essential to reassess the meaning and purpose of social policy and 
where it fits within the overall direction of contemporary British society. With the 
marginalisation of the collectivist and humanitarian aims of the post-war welfare 
settlement and promotion of a strongly individualistic culture and politics, it is 
necessary to reconsider what ‘the social’ means and why it is important for societal 
progress. First, this chapter considers what ‘the social’ has meant for social policy in 
the post-war welfare state period. Second, the paper examines how ‘the social’ aspect 
of policy has been downgraded over the last three and a half decades by the dominant 
neo-liberal approach. This has been achieved by a combination of policy change, the 
biased mobilisations of public discourse, and increasing individualisation and 
disempowerment experienced by citizens. Third, an alternative ‘social quality’ 
approach is proposed, which seeks to put ‘the social’ back into both social and 
economic policy. This alternative model, which focuses on humans as social beings 
and collective solutions to social problems, provides an as yet incomplete, but 
promising basis on which to oppose neoliberal policy and promote an alternative vision 
for social policy in the 21st century.  
 
What is ‘social’ policy? 
 
Two major strands of thought underpinned the social democratic post-war welfare 
state: democratic socialism and social liberalism. While the former position 
idealistically saw the welfare state as part of a parliamentary democratic route to a 
socialist society, the latter position placed a pragmatic and reformist emphasis on 
humanising the worst aspects of capitalism through the provision of welfare services 
without a requirement to overthrow it. Both strands of social democratic thought are 
intertwined in the development of social policy, formerly ‘social administration’, as an 
academic discipline. Social administration had origins in, among other places, the 
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London School of Economics, with Tawney’s pre-WWII work on equality and 
fellowship, and Titmuss as the first Professor of Social Administration at LSE in 1950. 
The social administration tradition paraded its multi-disciplinarity in drawing from 
economics, politics, philosophy, and sociology coupled with a very practical orientation 
towards addressing social problems, rather than abstract theoretical concerns and 
obscure academic debates. Instead its great strengths were (and still remain) a 
fundamental belief in collective provision as an expression of humanitarian values and 
a pragmatic, problem solving, approach to social welfare issues: the positive 
‘commitment to welfare’, as argued by Titmuss.  
 
Social policy within this framework was simply equated with public policy in the realm 
of social welfare; policy directed at improving society. Marshall (quoted in Townsend, 
1975, p.2) captured this perfectly:  
 
[t]he policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the 
welfare of citizens, by providing them with services or income [the central core 
of which includes] social insurance, public (or national) assistance, housing 
policy, education and the treatment of crime. 
 
Criticism of the two main planks of this tradition – the equation of the social with public 
services and the presumption that the welfare state always enhances welfare – was 
expressed famously by Titmuss in his seminal essay on ‘The Social Division of 
Welfare’. From a critical sociological perspective Titmuss argued that ‘social services’ 
should be defined by their aims, rather than the technical methods of administration 
and institutional procedures. By distinguishing social (or public), fiscal and 
occupational welfare he demonstrated that social policy may be implemented through 
a range of institutions rather than those conventionally labelled as ‘social services’. 
And, as the broadcasting of Cathy Come Home to a shocked nation in 1966 showed, 
the welfare state was not always benign in its treatment of people. For those on the 
receiving end of it often felt like social control and disempowerment. Thus, in Titmuss’s 
(1963, p.53) words the ‘welfare state’ is a ‘stereotype of welfare which represents only 
the more visible part of the real world of welfare’.  
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While Titmuss’s social division of welfare represented a paradigm shift in the analysis 
of social policy it only implicitly addressed the meaning of ‘the social’. That task was 
left to other sociologists, such as Donnison, and Townsend (1975, p.6, added 
emphasis), who prioritised the distributional core of social policy:  
 
[s]ocial policy is best conceived as a kind of blueprint for the management of 
society towards social ends: it can be defined as the underlying as well as the 
professed rationale by which social institutions and groups are used or brought 
into being to ensure social preservation or development. 
 
Although the radical potential of social policy conceived in terms of rationale is clear, 
the above definition focuses mainly on the ‘policy’ side of the pairing. What is still 
lacking is an understanding of the ‘social’ side that goes beyond the organisational 
and institutional dimension. Thus, fast-forwarding to contemporary work, we find 
‘social action’ is substituted for ‘governments’ but, otherwise, the essence of the 
optimistic Marshallian definition remains intact: social policy is ‘support for the well-
being of citizens provided through social action’ (Alcock, 2008, p.3).  
 
This perspective on the potential of collectivist, democratic and humanitarian values, 
especially in the form of a broader ‘welfare society’, rather than the narrower ‘welfare 
state’ begins to capture the sense of ‘the social’ in social policy. This theme is taken 
up further below in the proposition for the social quality approach to develop this idea. 
However, in practical policy terms, the positive vision of the classic social policy 
thinkers was, aside from the huge strides made in the immediate post-war Attlee 
administration, reluctantly embraced by British politicians and policy makers. Indeed, 
this led Esping-Andersen (1999) to consider Britain to have implemented a ‘mutated’ 
variant of social democracy. Despite some gains in areas of social welfare and 
collective organisation in the post-war years, classical free market liberalism and 
Victorian morality (institutional responses and policy interventions towards social 
problems that target only individual responsibilities and circumstances and not wider 
social structural causes, and moralising and degrading distinctions between ‘idle’ and 
‘deserving’ poor) remained strong influences on political thinking in the post-war 
period. This legacy was explicitly revived in the late 1970s and contributed heavily to 
the downgrading of the idea of ‘the social’ in Britain. 
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The neo-liberal project and the downgrading of ‘the social’ in policy 
 
Neoliberalism, an economic and political ideology which prescribes that human well-
being is best fulfilled by free markets, free trade and individual choice, has been the 
dominant policy paradigm, especially in the Anglo-American world since the late 1970s 
(Harvey, 2005). The normative argument for the value of individual freedom in the face 
of bureaucracy and totalitarian state interference has a long legacy in Right Wing 
libertarian and liberal thought, with Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom being a key 
contribution. This perspective has particular salience in liberal societies, such as the 
UK. In practice, the dominance and ‘scientific authority’ of economic thinking over the 
last three and a half decades has underpinned a global political and economic class 
project to reassert the concentration of extreme individual wealth and power in the 
hands of the few (Dorling, 2014). The consequences of this, apart from damage to the 
social fabric and the individual and social costs of increasing precarity and inequality, 
is to establish a new ‘common-sense’ around individualism and individual ‘projects of 
the self’, described by Mirowski (2013) as ‘everyday neo-liberalism’, and the exclusion 
of the values of democracy, collectivism and social integration. This transformation 
has provided the basis for the downgrading of ‘the social’ in both policy and everyday 
life. 
 
In the 1980s, the Conservative governments were brazen in their promulgation of neo-
liberal economic doctrine and neglect of ‘the social’, with Mrs Thatcher famously 
denying the existence of society itself and also arguing that ‘economics are the 
method; the object is to change the heart and soul’. The intended change was to 
remove the values of collectivism and the socialisation of risk amongst citizens, in 
favour of a more individualistic, self-interested and competitive society. Successive 
British governments of both right and left have constructed different narratives to try 
to differentiate themselves from the toxic legacy of 1980s neo-liberalism (examples 
are Major’s Citizens’ Charter, Blair’s Third Way and Cameron’s Big Society) but 
despite often large differences in rhetoric and small differences in policy, the overall 
logic driving these governments has been the same (Corbett & Walker, 2013). The 
consequences of this have been felt not just in policy terms and the effects on work 
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and living standards, but also in the organisation of power and influence within society 
as transmitted and amplified in the mass media, and concurrently, in the everyday 
imagination and ‘common-sense’ language of people in Britain (Mirowski, 2013). 
  
Economic versus social policy: from Thatcherism to ‘austerity’ 
 
It has long been recognised that neo-liberalism prioritises economic policy and 
marginalises the concerns of social policy. It is arguable that social policy has always 
ultimately been subordinate to economic policy in Britain. Successive governments 
since the 1980s, under the influence of the global neoliberal project, have further 
marginalised social policy in favour of a strongly economic and rational self-interest 
conception of human beings (utility maximising ‘economic men’). This underpinning 
rationality remains present in the context of a shift of emphasis in political rhetoric, 
public discourse and policy from the public sector burden arguments utilised widely in 
the 1980s, to the public-private partnerships in public services, ‘active’ welfare and 
consumer choice that characterised the British Third Way vision, to  the emphasis on 
‘austerity’ and deficit-reduction to further entrench neo-liberalism which has 
superseded the Conservatives’ apparent but fleeting rediscovery of ‘the social’ in the 
Big Society idea (Corbett & Walker, 2013). 
 
Central to the political success of Thatcher’s brand of neo-liberalism and its 
subsequent variants has been the remarkable adaptation, by a right-leaning political 
establishment in Britain, to the ‘culture of individualism’ that has been promoted more 
widely in post-industrial societies (Jordan, 2006). This has transferred risk and 
culpability from collective society, in the form of the state, to the individual and 
downplayed the role and potential of ‘the social’ in policy. As Jordan (2006, p.129) puts 
it 
 
[f]rom the perspective of the neoliberal governments of the 1980s, it was much 
better for people to borrow from banks than to pay taxes and receive benefits, 
because personal debt was chosen by the individual, whereas the tax-benefit 
system was imposed by the collective authority. 
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The first phase of neo-liberalism established the regulatory framework in the 1970s 
and 1980s by liberalising financial markets and constraining the scope of the public 
sector and the welfare state through cutting social expenditure, subsidising 
marketisation, implementing mean-tests, and residualising state provision. The period 
from the 1990s onwards established a so-called ‘social’ variant of neo-liberalism, 
which sought to adapt to the deep social shocks of these transformations by 
developing publicly funded, but harsher, policies oriented towards individual initiative 
and promoting self-help, with work as the solution to social problems such as poverty. 
This theme was central to the 1997 to 2010 New Labour Governments’ focus on ‘rights 
and responsibilities’ with the development of a more ‘contractualist’ welfare state. The 
welfare contractualism of Third Way politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s enacted 
this new ‘social’ variant of neo-liberalism despite some relative gains such as 
increased funding for the NHS, minimum wages and child care.  
 
This is evidenced in Giddens’ arguments for a ‘positive welfare’ approach which 
emphasises individual initiative in finding suitable paid employment and individual 
responsibilities in exchange for the social rights of citizenship. New Labour’s New Deal 
for Young People is a case in point where state support was called on in the demand 
for all under 25s unemployed for a period of six months to be doing either subsidised 
employment, environmental work, volunteering, or in full time education/training and 
no ‘fifth option’. Ultimately though, the aim of individual self-help solutions to collective 
problems of the quality and availability of work, social and economic inequalities, 
poverty and care issues is one of making markets socially acceptable, even a market 
in unemployed people themselves, fighting over whatever job vacancies are available. 
However, this contractualist Third Way approach conceded too much ground to the 
neo-liberals and has furthered an individualistic conception of policy issues which 
neglects ‘the social’ and, under the guise of consumerism, actually disempowers users 
of social services. As Harrison and Hemmingway (2014, p.28) argue ‘contracts often 
cannot involve equality of parties or consent in any reasonable sense, while 
discretionary power, surveillance and coercion may be present’. 
 
The political response to the financial crisis has helped to shape a further period of 
neoliberal marginalisation of ‘the social’. Under the narrative of austerity, the 
intensification of an unbridled neo-liberal policy agenda has forcefully promoted the 
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idea of social policy as a burden and a luxury, unaffordable in the new austere 
landscape. This helped to make ‘austerity’ narratives palatable to people as common-
sense rhetoric about public spending as economically wasteful, though arguably 
‘austerity’ is just the latest phase of the neo-liberal project (Mendoza, 2014). Public 
policy announcements have reflected the theme of contrasting ‘skivers’ and ‘strivers’, 
dismantling a supposed ‘something for nothing culture’, and even helping people 
‘trapped in the welfare system’, under the guise of ‘making work pay’; including a 
system of repeated assessments of disabled people to see if they are fit to work (and 
therefore no longer eligible for state support). Investigations have revealed a harsh, 
stressful and anxiety-inducing regime of testing disabled people, with tens of 
thousands of successful appeals and over two thousand deaths of disabled people, 
shortly after being found ‘fit for work’. 
 
In this context, policies aimed at the so-called ‘empowerment’ of individuals (including 
children) and communities boil down to governing the behaviour of ‘autonomous’ 
individuals through imposing individual responsibility for their freedom of choice (Ryan, 
2011). In Ryan’s (2011) analysis of techniques of governing children, shifting the focus 
of policy from universal provision to targeted supports for people that do not conform 
to the ideal of autonomous self-governing individuals means that issues such as child 
poverty, homelessness, suicide, and harmful behaviours (smoking and substance 
misuse) become framed in terms of their detrimental (individual) effects on future 
employability. However, another facet of this change is that compelling people to 
compete with each other on unequal terms exacerbates the social and personal 
problems which collective provision and social citizenship were previously intended to 
address (Ryan, 2011). 
 
Recent proposals by the Conservative Government to redefine child poverty along 
more individualistic and moralistic lines, focus on addiction, family breakdown and 
personal debt while removing some long accepted and internationally valid measures 
of relative deprivation, which are likely to reduce the official levels of poverty in Britain. 
In other words, for the Government, poverty should be a concern centred around ‘bad’ 
life choices and ‘cultures of worklessness’ rather than structural issues of power, 
participation in society, material inequality and access to labour markets. 
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Ultimately, neo-liberal marketisation under the guise of increasing individual freedom 
does not promote voice for citizens, nor does it increase the quality of public services 
such as transport, healthcare, housing or basic utilities, functions of the welfare state, 
or, indeed, the quality of ‘the social’. Instead, the market solution enables ‘exit’ options, 
primarily for those with the money and other resources to take-up privatised welfare, 
leaving residualised services for those unable to opt-out. The emphasis on the option 
to exit from collective provision to enable ‘freedom of choice’ has negative 
consequences for those without the resources to exercise such options. It has long 
been argued that the neoliberal project  
 
suppresses any conception that for many people a decent life means a constant 
struggle against the ‘impersonal’ decisions of the market. However, the 
unemployed, single parents, the disabled, the elderly, ethnic minorities, women, 
are unlikely to be impressed by the news that their disadvantaged positions are 
sure signs of their freedom, and by the insistence that any attempt to organise 
collective assistance for them will rob them of their liberty (Belsey, 1986, p.193). 
 
Although not mentioned in the ‘freedom of choice’ narrative and not often felt in the 
bubble of privilege that neo-liberal policies create, the division of society between 
haves and have-nots diminishes everyone, including the former. For example, 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) estimate that if Britain had the same distribution of 
income and wealth as the four most equal countries in the world, mental health 
problems might be halved.  
 
The prioritisation of economic policy and economic thinking under the guise of 
individual freedom and consumer choice has marginalised the collectivist, egalitarian, 
integrative and empowering possibilities of a genuinely ‘social’ policy. The outcome of 
this neo-liberal project is vast increases in inequality, and the reduction of life chances 
for many; coupled with increases in consumer choice for the rich and residual provision 
for those left behind. The operational meaning of ‘social policy’ in this context, in 
contrast to private debt-fuelled consumption, is increasingly individualised, punitive, 
authoritarian and de-socialised. One of the key challenges for the early 21st century is 
therefore to draw on the legacy of the earlier social policy tradition and put ‘the social’ 
back into social policy in order to work towards societal progress. 
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For ‘social policy’ we need social quality 
 
The idea of social quality emerged in the 1990s in response to the neo-liberal inspired 
downgrading of ‘the social’ in policy in different European countries and within EU 
policy making (Beck et al., 1997). Two challenges were spotlighted: the dominance of 
economic thinking and the democratic deficit. As within several Member States at that 
time (and more generally later) the development of the EU was constructed almost 
entirely as an economic project. The foremost example was Economic and Monetary 
Union (which preceded the single currency). This was undoubtedly a historically 
unique form of European political unification, but while it focused on economic 
integration, it ignored the social dimension of this process. The social dimension has 
been recently recognised in the ‘going beyond GDP’ discourse (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
However, even in the report of Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, ‘the economic’ is fore 
grounded in place of ‘the social’. The democratic deficit was hotly debated at the time 
and remains a deep concern ever since. Social quality was developed specifically to 
address these challenges by providing a conceptual and empirical tool by which, on 
the one hand, to frame comprehensive policy approaches which valued both economic 
and social dimensions and, on the other, a measuring rod with which citizens could 
engage in political debates about the direction and pace of development. It is expressly 
against the processes of individualisation associated with neo-liberalism and for 
‘social’ policy. 
 
Social quality is defined as ‘the extent to which people are able to participate in the 
social and economic lives of their communities under conditions which enhance their 
well-being and potential’ (Beck et al., 1997, p.9). The centrality of participation in the 
definition derives from the core assumption that humans are social beings and derive 
their identities, self-realisation and, to a large extent, well-being, from social 
recognition. The contrast with neo-liberal and neo-classical utility maximising 
‘economic men’ is obvious. The emphasis on democracy and participation also seeks 
to develop a new direction for social policy to overcome the prior problems of the 
uncaring or disempowering forms of provision even in the social democratic welfare 
state.  
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Within the social quality model the social world comprises two sets of tensions. On the 
one hand there is the tension between societal and biographical development while, 
on the other, there is the tension between the worlds of systems and those of 
communicative structures. Across the field of the interplay between these tensions is 
enacted a constant process whereby people interact within diverse collectives which, 
in turn, provide the essential context for their self-realisation. Human social action and 
the wider framing structure of society must therefore both be taken into consideration 
in devising social policies. 
 
Everyday life takes place in the context of these two sets of tensions and individuals 
seek self-realisation in their interaction within various collectives (family, community, 
workplace and so on). Then, and this is the critical step with regard to practical 
applications, there are four specific conditional factors governing the realisation of 
social quality:   
 
 Socio-economic security: the extent of ownership of material resources and 
rights over time (including environmental security).  
 Social cohesion: the extent to which social relations, based on identities, values 
and norms, are shared.  
 Social inclusion: the extent to which people have access to and are integrated 
into the different institutions and relations that constitute everyday life.  
 Social empowerment: the extent to which social structures enhance personal 
capabilities and the ability to participate in daily life.  
 
Although these four conditional factors are placed in a separate part of the quadrangle 
formed by the two interacting tensions, they overlap in practice (Diagram 1).  
 
Diagram 1 Quadrangle of the Conditional Factors 
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For measurement purposes each of the four conditional factors comprises between 
four and six domains including financial resources (socio-economic security), trust 
(social cohesion), citizenship rights (social inclusion) and supportiveness of institutions 
(social empowerment). The concept has been used extensively in social science 
research in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. This does not mean, however, 
that it is a finished product. For one thing it requires a relatively parsimonious 
aggregate index in order to measure and compare social quality across different 
nations. For another, the complex task of developing and incorporating indicators of 
the impact (positive and negative) of environmental conditions on both objective and 
subjectively perceived security into the model needs to be undertaken. Sustainability 
is yet another dimension of social quality that requires attention in the face of 
increasing social and environmental catastrophes associated with climate change. 
Finally there is the apparent paradox of a concept purporting to be ‘social’ yet being 
measured at the individual level. This is legitimate in methodological terms, however, 
first because of the absence of comparative objective data for measurement purposed; 
second, because individual responses provide evidence of social context and, third 
because these responses are aggregated. Despite its rough edges social quality 
provides what myriad quality of life indices do not, which is an assessment of social 
relations and their impact. Moreover it has the advantages over the rival concepts that 
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it is far more comprehensive, oriented to society rather than interpersonal relations 
and attempts to define and operationalise ‘the social’.  
 
With reference to social policy, social quality clearly goes beyond the conventional 
equation of the social with the state or with social welfare. Thus it offers an opportunity 
for social policy to connect, or re-connect, with the social and resist the widespread 
de-socialisation as a consequence of neoliberal policy choices outlined above. What 
would this mean in practice? It seems to us that the possibilities are legion. Here are 
just six for starters.  
 
First, the application of social quality should awaken a debate about the essence of 
social quality and especially the ‘social’ part of the pairing. Second, it would provide a 
new focus for societal progress in the form of well-being oriented participation for the 
many, instead of either economistic GDP growth or minimalistic welfarism protection 
from hunger and poverty (just one component of socio-economic security, albeit a vital 
one). Third, it would provide new explicit and measurable social quality goals, such as 
maximising social cohesion and social empowerment in policy and theory (neither of 
which figure on coherent government or academic agendas). Fourth, the application 
of social quality would place social empowerment at the heart of social policy to 
replace, hopefully, the anti-social consumerist deception of individual choice, which 
too often masquerades as empowerment. Fifth, it would facilitate social policy as the 
focus for citizen participation and involvement; for example by examining openly and 
democratically the social quality of different cities, communities or neighbourhoods 
and participation in meaningful localised and democratic decision making. Sixth, for 
social policy analysts there is the challenge to complement welfare regime analyses 
with an examination of social quality regimes. What configurations of institutional and 
policy paths, political priorities, normative values and structural relations (gender, race, 
age, class and so on) reproduce different outcomes in terms of social quality?   
 
Conclusion: a defence of welfare or pro-social policy? 
 
This chapter has considered the consequences of neo-liberalism in policy terms and 
its connection to everyday understandings of the social, and suggested that in order 
to renew the social in social policy, alternative approaches to the different variants of 
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neoliberal policy prescriptions over the last three and a half decades must be 
constructed. We began by bringing into focus the conceptualisation of social policy in 
post-war social administration perspectives, and the importance of ‘the social’ part of 
the concept. Evidence in the second part of the chapter highlighted the deeply 
corrosive consequences of centring neoliberal policy around individual freedom and 
consumer choice, which have paradoxically, increased moralising techniques for 
social control and disempowerment, while reducing individual freedom for many 
unable to advance through market-based purchasing of welfare services. The 
prioritisation of an economic understanding of human motivation and downgrading of 
the social nature of human beings is cited as a key facet of this. 
 
In order to overcome the problem of policy that focuses on correcting individual 
behaviours and ‘enabling’ individual projects of self-realisation we must consider what 
is entailed in putting the social back into social policy. It was suggested in the third 
section that the social quality approach is a useful concept to seriously engage with a 
theory of the social and the political, policy and power implications of a pro-social 
policy. While social quality is subject to ongoing critical debate and development, 
socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion and social empowerment 
are recognised as legitimate conditional factors that a pro-social programme for 
government would need to engage with. But above all, the recognition that humans 
are social beings, rather than rational utility maximisers would be a powerful starting 
point.  
 
The social policy community, including academic, policy making, practitioner and 
social activist dimensions has in recent years been on the defensive, seeking to protect 
valued services and provisions from further neoliberal retrenchment (Foster et al., 
2015). This is a valuable form of action but, what is required also is the momentum to 
develop a new direction for a pro-social policy which recognises the legacy of social 
policy traditions, but emphasises new forms of participation, empowerment and 
democracy in the service of collectivist and humanitarian societal progress. Hay and 
Payne (2015, p.3) have begun a debate on the parallel political economy dimension 
in the form of civic capitalism; ‘the governance of the market, by the state, in the name 
of the people, to deliver collective public goods, equity and social justice’. These 
developments all emphasise the need to put ‘the social’ back into social policy, in the 
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spirit of the optimistic and idealistic vision of the creators of the post-war welfare state, 
with the ultimate aims of combatting inequality and promoting universal well-being.  
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